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Abstract: We study the stochastic dynamics of a renewable resource harvested by a mo-
nopolist facing a downward sloping demand curve. We introduce a framework where harvesting
sequentially affects the resource’s potential to regenerate, resulting in an endogenous ecological
regime shift. In a multi-period setting, the firm’s objective is to find the profit-maximizing har-
vesting policy while simultaneously detecting in the quickest time possible the change in regime.
Solving analytically, we show that a negative regime shift induces an aggressive extraction be-
haviour due to shorter detection periods, creating a sense of urgency, and higher markup in
prices. Precautionary behaviour can result due to decreasing resource rent. We study the prob-
ability of extinction and show the emergence of catastrophe risk which can be both reversible
and irreversible.
1 Introduction
The exploitation of renewable resources such as overfishing of the North Sea cod, deforestation
in the Amazon and soil degradation due to unsustainable agricultural practices, is receiving con-
siderable attention. The dynamic management of these resources often involve decisions about
optimal extraction policies under ecological uncertainty, defined by Pindyck (2002) as uncer-
tainty over the evolution of the relevant ecosystem. This raises pertinent economic questions
about the behaviour and actions of a firm harvesting these resources, especially if the dynamics
driving the resource growth change. One way the current literature captures this uncertainty
is via stochastic bio-economic models, reflected in the variance of the fluctuations. Another is
to focus on ecological regime shifts, defined as an abrupt change in the structure of the natural
ecosystems supplying the resource or a change in the system dynamics such as intrinsic growth
rate or the carrying capacity of the resource (Polasky et al. (2011); Arvaniti et al. (2019)).
There already exists a large literature studying the impact of stochastic fluctuations on ex-
traction activities, mainly utilizing real options theory (Andersen and Sutinen (1984); Pindyck
(1984); Reed (1988); Reed and Clarke (1990); Saphores (2003); Alvarez and Koskela (2007);
Pizarro and Schwartz (2018)). An emerging literature builds on this to integrate resource man-
agement with a variety of regime shifts, such as Polasky et al. (2011), Ren and Polasky (2014),
Baggio and Fackler (2016), de Zeeuw and He (2017) and Arvaniti et al. (2019)1. These stud-
ies, however, are limited in two respects. With the exception of Pindyck (1984), none of these
works incorporate a market structure and take the price as fixed or exogenous. This is done for
tractability but leads to results that may underestimate the crucial role of a market structure,
which in fact often drives the firm’s harvesting decisions. Second, the literature on regime shifts
implicitly assumes the firm to be able to discern the change in resource dynamics and subse-
quently make the appropriate extraction decision2. We take a different approach from earlier
∗neha.deopa@graduateinstitute.ch
†daniele.rinaldo@graduateinstitute.ch
1Refer to Li et al. (2018) for an overview.
2We use the words extraction and harvesting interchangeably
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studies and ask: within a resource market where prices are endogenously determined, how does
an ecological regime shift influence the firm’s harvesting decisions? what is the profit maximizing
policy of this firm who wants to detect this shift and where this change in regime is endogenously
determined by the firm’s own extraction activities?
We build a model of a monopolist firm, facing a downward sloping demand curve, who
encounters two sources of uncertainty in the resources dynamics. The first takes the form of
natural randomness of the environmental conditions (variance) and the other in the timing of
the ecological regime shift. This shift, defined as a change in the resource’s ability to grow, is
made dependent on the firm’s own extraction efforts. In our model, the firm knows with cer-
tainty that a regime shift will occur and thus the probability of the shift occurring is not under
consideration. However it is the timing which matters to the firm for it’s harvesting decisions.
In a multi-period setting, the monopolist wants to detect this shift as soon as possible, and this
detection procedure is explicitly incorporated in its profit maximizing actions. The resource
dynamics are assumed to be monitored by the monopolist through sequential observations and
we model the firm’s detection process based on quickest detection methods. These build on
solving the classical sequential detection problem as an optimal stopping problem with the aim
to detect a change in the resource growth, if one occurs, as quickly as possible. Much of the
resource literature focuses on a stationary population processes: non-stationariety generated by
changes in environmental conditions, however, is more common in the physical world (Szuwal-
ski and Hollowed (2016)). Using the sequential nature of the detection process we incorporate
non-stationary dynamics in our model. This, combined with the multi-period framework, leads
to a result where a change in regime alters the monopolist’s time horizon for that period.
Our model has analytical solutions and shows that in the event of a negative regime shift, for
low stock levels, the firm adopts a precautionary policy by extracting less. This is because the
change in regime creates a physical scarcity of the resource which in turn increases the resource
rent for the monopolist and this leads to reduced extraction levels. However for higher stock
levels this effect is outweighed due to an interplay of two factors: (i) an altered and relatively
shorter time horizon due to detecting a regime shift, which creates a sense of urgency and (ii)
market preferences, where an elastic demand allows the firm to increase its markup compared
to pre-regime shift period. Together this reduces the resource rent and results in the monopolist
adopting an aggressive behaviour by increasing extraction. Lastly we define the risk of catas-
trophe where the resource maybe driven to extinction and differentiate between and irreversible
and reversible catastrophe.
In the next section we lay out the different building blocks of the model and describe how it
all comes together and section 3 discusses the solutions and their implications. In section 4 we
define the risk and first passage time to catastrophe and section 5 provides a short note on how
our model would translate to real time. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We start with a model that is relatively simple to analyze, and allows for closed form solutions.
2.1 Resource Dynamics
Following the basic framework of Pindyck (1984) we start by modeling the evolution of the
renewable resource stock Xt. Let Xt be the stock at time t, which behaves according to the
stochastic differential equation
dXt =
(
µ− qt
)
dt+ σdWt (1)
where qt ∈ R+ is the resource extraction chosen by the firm, σ ∈ R+ is the intensity of noise
in the evolution of the resource stock, µ ∈ R+ is the constant growth rate of the resource and
2
Xt ≥ 03. Finally,Wt is the standard Brownian motion in the filtered probability space (Ω,F , P ).
In order to capture the regime shift that the dynamic system can undergo, we describe two
alternative scenarios faced by the firm: one in which the resource evolves according to equation
(1), and an alternative one in which the stock’s ability to regenerate - the drift - changes. This is
consistent with Polasky et al. (2011) in which a regime shift is defined as a change in the system
dynamics such as intrinsic growth rate or the carrying capacity of the resource. The evolution
for the resource stock then becomes
dXt =
(
µ+ λ− qt
)
dt+ σdWt, (2)
where λ ∈ R is the change in resource growth. If λ < 0, the growth rate of the resource is re-
duced, and vice versa. To provide some intuition, we give two examples where we would observe
such a change in drift. In the context of fisheries the term
(
µ+ λ
)
, where λ < 0, would indicate
recruitment overfishing which occurs when the parent stock (spawning biomass) is depleted to
a level where it no longer has the reproductive capacity to replenish itself i.e. there are not
enough adults to produce recruits (Pauly (1983)). The collapse of the Atlantic northern cod in
Newfoundland in the early nineties was attributed to gross overestimation of stock sizes and the
failure to recognize that recruitment overfishing was a definite possibility (Walters and Maguire
(1996)). Similarly logging and timber production have a direct impact on forest recovery and
tree recruitment and growth. There is evidence that the current practice of felling cycles of
around 30 years may be insufficient to enable tropical forest recovery (de Avila et al. (2017)).
An example of a positive regime shift with
(
µ+ λ
)
, where λ > 0, can be seen in China’s forest
dynamics - which has shown an increase in the forest cover by more than 46,000 square miles
between 2000 and 2010 (Viña et al. (2016))4.
Equation (2) implies that the firm’s harvesting activities do not affect the resource’s ability
to regenerate in any way. However, this assumption does not seem grounded in empirical ob-
servation and it can be seen from the examples above that often the firm’s harvesting decisions
influence the resource’s recruitment and growth process. Thus we rewrite (2) as:
dXt =
(
µ+ λ(qex)− qt
)
dt+ σdWt, (3)
where ex is the past time period that determines the magnitude of λ. We therefore study a
framework in which past extraction decisions determine the future changes in resource growth.
We want to model the scenario in which at a given change point in time θ, which is happening
with certainty but at time unknown, the stochastic differential equation (SDE) driving the
resource stock will switch between drifts, and the growth rate of the resource will change:
dXt =
{(
µ− qt
)
dt+ σdWt t < θ(
µ+ λ(qex)− qt
)
dt+ σdWt t ≥ θ.
(4)
The sign of λ(qex) can be both positive or negative, which represents the fact that the effect of
firm extraction on the resource growth can be both positive or negative. This also implies that
the firm’s actions influences the magnitude of the change of regime. Note that as the occurrence
of θ is certain, the question facing the monopolist is not « if » a regime shift will occur but
rather when. This framework seems appropriate for today, where the focus has moved on from
questions of probability of collapses and regime shifts, to that of when and how will one deal
with it. At first glance it may appear odd that the occurrence of the shift itself is exogenous but
the magnitude and direction is endogenous to firm’s actions. A more intuitive way to under-
stand this is even if the monopolist, say a fishery, ceased it’s harvesting actions, other climactic
factors such as rising sea surface temperature would still eventually alter the marine ecosystem,
3This positivity constraint allows the problem to have reasonable implications and a relatively simple solution,
at the expense of an increase of the hidden mathematical requirements for the solution to be sufficient and unique.
4Although China’s forests have experienced an increase in growth, it has been at the expense of exerting
negative impact on other forested areas around the world. During the period China introduced sustainable
logging of natural forests, it also became one of the world’s leading timber importers (Liu (2014)).
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resulting in a regime shift. However the added fishing pressure by the monopolist influences the
magnitude of this shift.
The firm now faces two sources of uncertainty when choosing the harvesting policy to maxi-
mize its profits. The first is σ, which is the environmental variation due to the natural random-
ness of environmental conditions - our choice of the diffusion coefficient σ being independent
of the state Xt (i.e. a drifted Brownian motion) is to include the possibility that the natural
randomness of the environment may drive the resource to extinction, something that lognormal
fluctuations from a geometric Brownian motion by construction cannot represent. The second
is the timing of λ(qex), indicating which regime is the firm currently operating in.
2.2 Firm Dynamics
We consider a risk-neutral monopolist facing a linear inverse demand function of the form p(q) =
a− bq, with quadratic harvesting costs cq(t,Xt)2/2, and with fixed costs F where c, F ≥ 0. The
harvesting rate is chosen by the firm in order to maximize the expected value of the sum of
discounted profits subject to the constraint (4), and the profit function takes the form
Π(q) =
[
(a− bq)q − cq
2
2
− F
]
(5)
We assume a profit function not directly depending on the stock levelX but only on the harvested
quantity: this implies a marginal cost function linear in harvesting, rather than the stock level,
and fixed operating costs. This assumption can be relaxed, at the expense of a complicated form
of the optimal extraction function, is omitted.
2.3 Optimal Detection
The firm’s problem now involves the detection of the change in drift of Xt, as seen in (4). Envi-
ronmental monitoring of the resource to detect for changes in the stock and its structure is quite
common in real-world renewable resource management. Klemas (2013) talks about how remote
sensing techniques, in near-real time, help detect changes that affect the recruitment, distribu-
tion patterns and survival of fish stocks. These techniques, combined with in situ measurements,
constitute the most effective ways for efficient management and controlled exploitation of marine
resources. Shimabukuro et al. (2019) details the monitoring of deforestation and forest degra-
dation in the Brazilian Amazon. Another example is The Waterfowl Breeding Population and
Habitat Survey in North America5, which is a continental monitoring program providing infor-
mation on spring population size and trajectory for certain duck species. This in turn is used
for the annual establishment of mallard hunting regulations in the United States and Canada
(Nichols and Williams (2006)).
The monopolist monitors the resource stock via sequential observations and uses quickest
detection (QD) methods to detect the regime change. These methods employ a likelihood ratio
for two models, one for the status quo (‘no change in regime’) and one for a new state (‘regime
change detected’). For each observation, the model likelihoods and their ratio are updated.
When the updated likelihood ratio exceeds a detection threshold, an alarm is triggered. The
aim is to minimize the time to detection of a change point, given the monopolist’s tolerance
for false alarms. When the statistical threshold is crossed and the alarm is triggered, the firm
will act on it to change its extraction levels to that which will maximize its profit for the new
regime6. This is in line with an emerging literature in ecology, addressing indicators of approach-
ing thresholds, or impending collapse in ecosystems with a focus on QD methods (Carpenter
5It is conducted cooperatively by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and Canadian Wildlife Service. It has
been conducted every year since 1955
6For a short introduction to quickest detection methods refer to Polunchenko et al. (2013). For a more detailed
review refer to Poor and Hadjiliadis (2008)
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et al. (2014); Batt et al. (2013); Scheffer et al. (2015).
The firm searches for a “rule” (an optimal stopping time) τ adapted to the filtration Ft,
at which it detects the change point, θ, so it may reassess its harvesting decisions given the
change of environment in which it operates. This gives rise to the problem of quickest change-
point detection. In the period before the change point θ, the dynamics of the resource Xt are
determined by the (possibly nonlinear) SDE
dXt =
(
µ− qt
)
dt+ σdWt.
Girsanov theory tells us that the process
Mt = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
µ− qs
σ
dWs − 1
2
∫ t
0
(µ− qs)2
σ2
ds
)
is a P -martingale. Therefore, the process
W˜t = Wt +
∫ t
0
µ− qs
σ
ds
is a Q-Brownian motion, where one obtains the new probability measure by Q = EP (Mt). The
process Xt therefore admits the representation
Xt = x0 +
∫ t
0
dW˜s
and is therefore a Brownian motion under the measure Q. The firm’s detection problem now
becomes
dXt =
{
dW˜t t < θ
λ(qex) + dW˜t t ≥ θ.
(6)
If the period ex that determines λ is outside the interval [0, t], then the firm’s detection problem
reverts exactly to the Brownian disorder problem, which is the detection of the change between
a martingale and a sub/supermartingale, depending on the sign of λ. This requires that the
harvesting decisions, that define both sign and magnitude of the change in resource growth, be
set strictly before the time of the initial condition on X (here normalized to 0, i.e. X0). We
note that the disorder problem (6) based on the observation of the resource stock Xt is equiv-
alent in probability to the disorder problem based on the observation of the residual process
Yt = Xt−
∫ t
0
µ−qs
σ ds under the original measure. In other words, the firm can detect the change
by either observing the resource stock and changing measure appropriately, or by extracting
residuals from the stock variation, the growth rate and the optimal extraction policy and then
studying the original P -Brownian motion. The computational difference between the two is
marginal if the extraction policy is of simple form, such as constant or linear and the resulting
controlled resource stock remains Gaussian, but the second strategy could be of substantially
simpler implementation when the extraction policy qt is nonlinear or not available in closed form.
Change-point detection in the disorder problem involves the optimization of the trade off
between two measures, one being the delay between the time a change occurs and it is detected
i.e. (τ − θ)+, and the other being a measure of the frequency of false alarms for events of the
type (τ < θ). This problem has been first studied by Shiryaev (1963), and the procedure of the
cumulative sum process (CUSUM) has been proven to be optimal by Shiryaev (1996) and in the
case of multiple drifts by Hadjiliadis and Moustakides (2006).
The firm minimizes the worst possible detection delay over all possible realizations of paths
of Xt before the change and over all possible change points θ. This is given by
J(τ) = sup
θ
ess supEθ[(τ − θ)+|Fθ] (7)
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and the stopping rule is obtained by minimizing (7) under a “false alarm” constraint. This
stochastic control problem is given by
min
τ
J(τ) s.t. Eθ=∞[τ ] = T.
This constraint gives the class of stopping times τ , for which the mean time Eθ=∞[τ ] until giving
a (false) alarm is equal to T . It can be interpreted as a measure of the “quality” of the detection
system, since it fixes the expected delay in the detection under a false alarm, i.e. when θ = ∞
(the process never actually changes regime).
It is shown by Hadjiliadis and Moustakides (2006) that one can only focus on the constraints
that bind with equality. The CUSUM procedure involves first observing the process given by
the logarithm of the likelihood ratio (the Radon-Nikodym derivative) of the process Xt (note
that we are under the measure Q) under the two regimes and comparing it with its minimum
observed value. Define
ut(β) = log
dQθ=0
dQθ=∞
= λ(qex)Xt − λ
2
2
t.
The CUSUM statistic process is then given by the difference at any instant s ≤ t between ut
and its minimum obtained value up to that instant, namely
CSt(λ(qex)) = ut(λ(qex))− inf
0≤s≤t
ut(λ(qex)) ≥ 0.
This can be interpreted simply by noticing that if the two regimes are very similar (i.e. |λ| is very
small), then the Radon-Nikodym derivative will be close to unity, implying that the CUSUM
process will be most of the time close to zero, and it will be difficult to detect the presence of
such a small drift. If on the other hand the two regimes are rather different, then one should
be able to detect more easily when the regime changes, and the CUSUM process should reflect
this change as it increases. One would therefore expect to search for a threshold in order to
determine when the CUSUM process is “large enough” to reflect the change of regime: this is
indeed the case. Shiryaev (1996) and Hadjiliadis and Moustakides (2006) show that the optimal
CUSUM stopping rule is given by the stopping time
τ(λ(qex), ν) = inf{t ≥ 0;CSt ≥ ν), (8)
where the threshold ν is given by the root of the equation
2
λ(qex)2
(eν − ν − 1) = T.
It can be shown that the delay function of this procedure is given by
E[τ(λ(qex), ν)] =
2
λ(qex)2
(e−ν + ν − 1). (9)
At the stopping time τ , therefore, the firm will detect the change in drift of λ in (6), which means
that the firm will have detected a change from a Q-martingale to a Q-sub/supermartingale. Note
immediately that the larger the change in drift λ, the smaller the threshold ν and the “earlier”
one expects the CUSUM process to hit the threshold. If λ is very small, then ν will be very
large and the firm may wait for much longer before detecting a change of regime: in such a case
it may be that τ(λ(qex), ν) ≥ T , and once T is reached the firm will assume that the regime has
changed. This result implies that the firm up to time τ will program its profit maximization
assuming that the non-controlled part of the drift in the SDE driving Xt is given by µ, and
subsequently by (µ+ λ(qex)).
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2.4 Profit Maximization
If the firm’s harvesting activities do not impact the growth of the resource, as seen in (2), then
its actions do not influence the time and the magnitude of the change of regime. Therefore the
change is entirely exogenous from the firm’s point of view and the stochastic control problem is:
sup
q∈Q
E0
∫ τ
0
Π(qs)e
−ρsds+ Eτ
∫ ∞
τ
Π(qs)e
−ρsds (10)
dXt =
{(
µ− qt
)
dt+ σdWt t < τ(
µ+ λ− qt
)
dt+ σdWt t ≥ τ
(11)
The simplest way of modeling a regime shift is to assume that the shift occurs only once,
as in Polasky et al. (2011) and Ren and Polasky (2014). However, as pointed by Sakamoto
(2014), regime shifts are better modeled as open-ended processes. An example being the Pacific
ecosystem, where in the mid-1970s, the Pacific changed from a cool “anchovy regime” to a warm
“sardine regime” and a shift back to an anchovy regime occurred in the middle to late 1990s
(Chavez et al. (2003)). The above model can be straightforwardly extended to a multi-period
setting, in which the firm detects multiple regime changes throughout subsequent periods and
adjusts its optimal harvesting policy accordingly. The problem will then read:
sup
q∈Q
∞∑
i=0
Eτi
∫ τi+1
τi
Π(t, qt)e
−ρtdt (12)
dXt =
{(
µ+ λi − qt
)
dt+ σdWt t ∈ [i, i+ 1)(
µ+ λi+1 − qt
)
dt+ σdWt t ≥ i+ 1.
(13)
where i ∈ N are the different periods, and the harvesting policy exists among the class of
admissible controls Q. Here λ0 = 0 and τi, λi are the subsequent detection times and relative
changes in resource growth. We assume τ0 = 0 for simplicity. However to incorporate the firm’s
actions in a way that it affects the resource’s ability to grow and regenerate, as in (3), introduces
tractability issues with the model. The explicit dependence of the stopping time τ on λ(qex)
makes the control variable q and the limit of integration τ simultaneous, and the model becomes
intractable. In order to circumvent this issue, we formalize the structure of the firm’s harvesting
decisions in a sequential manner, where the firm assumes a constant λ(qex) for each period. We
explain this in detail in the next section.
Up until the first detection time τ1 the firm assumes that Xt is still driven by Wt, therefore
the value of the firm is given by
V (0, X0) = sup
q∈Q
E0
∫ τ1
0
Π(q)e−ρtdt
s.t. dXt = (µ− q)dt+ σdWt. (14)
Xt ≥ 0,
Before solving the problem, let us first characterize the solution given the positivity constraint.
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for the firm’s optimization problem reads
0 = Vt − ρV + max
q∈Q
{
(a− bq)q − c
2
q2 − F − qVx
}
+ µVx +
σ2
2
Vxx, Xt ≥ 0. (15)
where Q is the set of admissible Markov controls 7. Once solved, this problem will yield a control
in the feedback form q(Xt). Because of the constraint Xt ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ [0, τ1], the value function
7 See Fleming and Soner (2006) for the full definition of control admissibility.
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V (t, x) is not necessarily always differentiable. Using viscosity solutions, as first shown in the
fundamental work by Crandall and Lions (1981), we show in the appendix that the value func-
tion V is a weak solution of the optimization problem (15), and if we obtain a form of V we can
conclude it solves the firm’s problem (in a weak sense).
Equation (15) implies an optimal extraction policy given by
q∗(t,Xt) =
[
a− Vx
2b+ c
]
+
. (16)
Note that this implies that in order for extraction to stay positive, Vx ≥ a, meaning the re-
source rent cannot exceed the demand intercept parameter. This is clearly a consequence of the
assumption of linear demand, which results in a quadratic criterion. It will be clear in what
follows that the solution will be naturally constrained by the boundary conditions to satisfy this
requirement. Substituting in (15) and grouping terms, we obtain the following partial differential
equation:
0 = Vt − ρV +AVx +BV 2x +
σ2
2
Vxx + C (17)
where the constants A,B and C are given by
A = µ− a
2b+ c
,
B =
1
2(2b+ c)
,
C =
a2
2(2b+ c)
− F.
The natural boundary conditions of this problem are given by
V (t, x) = 0 for x < 0, V (t, 0) = 0, q(t, 0) = 0 (18)
without imposing a smooth pasting condition because of the viscosity argument. We also have
an absorbing boundary with discontinuity for q given by
lim
q↑x
q(t, x) = q∗(t, x), lim
q↓x
q(t, x) = 0,
meaning that when the optimal harvesting policy reaches the actual level of the resource stock,
the firm will have harvested the entire resource, and once this level is hit the harvesting shifts
immediately to zero because of the natural boundary conditions (as well as common sense).
Because of the form of the profit function, we guess a solution of the HJB equation of the form
V (t, x) = eρ(t−τ1)V (x)
and we linearize it with the nonlinear change of variable
V ′(x) =
σ2
2B
ψ′(x)
ψ(x)
= e−ρ(t−τ1)Vx(t, x)
where ψ(.) is a general twice differentiable function on R. By this linearization, one can easily
obtain the general solution
ψg(x) = c1e
α1x + c2e
α2x. (19)
where α1,2 = −A±
√
A2−4BC
σ2 and α2 < α1. The constants are given by the boundary conditions
(18), after noticing that V (t, 0) = 0 implies ψ(0) = 1. The particular solution can be computed
in closed form, but its expression is lengthy and therefore omitted, and henceforth only referred
to as ψ(x). The optimal harvesting policy in feedback form is therefore
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q∗(t, x) = qm − σ2ψ
′(x)
ψ(x)
e−ρ(τ1−t), (20)
where qm = a2b+c is the quantity at which the monopolist’s marginal revenue equals marginal
cost: it’s the profit maximizing harvesting policy the monopolist would choose if there were no
fluctuations in the evolution of the resource (i.e. if σ = 0). Observe that Vx here is the rent
associated with a unit of the resource stock. It is the scarcity value or the market value of the
marginal unit of in situ stock. From (16) we obtain the resource rent for the monopolist:
Vx = σ
2ψ
′(x)
ψ(x)
e−ρ(τ1−t)(2b+ c) (21)
The optimal harvesting function exhibits a sigmoid-like form8, resulting in the following limiting
behavior:
lim
x→∞ q
∗(t, x) = qm − ν(Θ)e−ρ(τ1−t), (22)
lim
τc→∞
q∗(t, x) = qm. (23)
where ν is a general continuous and bounded function of the model parameters. This result
shows that for any time t ∈ [0, τ1], there is a maximum harvesting level given by a fixed amount,
generated by market conditions, minus a parameter which incorporates the dynamics of the
resource stock, modulated by the distance between present and the detection time representing
the time horizon of the firm. If this time horizon is long enough, all resource-related parameters
are ignored and the monopolist’s optimal harvest is entirely driven by the market.
We therefore have an optimal harvesting policy that has two parts: one driven purely by market
preferences. It is increasing on the maximum price the consumers are willing to pay i.e. repre-
sentative of consumer preferences (a) and decreasing in sensitivity of price to extraction and the
slope of the demand curve faced by the monopolist and its cost (b and c). The second part is
variable and explicitly dependent on state Xt and current time, as well as the market and other
model parameters. We can therefore write the optimal extraction policy as
q∗(t, x, λ) = qm − qv(t, x, λ), (24)
and the resource rent as:
Vx(t, x, λ) = q
v(t, x, λ)(2b+ c) (25)
Note that when the market value of the marginal unit of in situ resource rises, q∗ decreases
2.5 Sequential Detection and Optimal Behavior
To understand how the regime shift is endogenous to the firm’s harvesting efforts and the role of
the detection time, let us insert the solution to the firm’s optimization problem in the sequential
detection scenario. A schematic representation of which can be seen in Figure 1.
Period [0, τ1] : At the initial time t = 0 the resource Xt is driven by a diffusion process with
natural growth rate µ and the firm begins harvesting activity at level q∗(0, x0). At a random
time θ1 ∈ [0, T ], there is an initial exogenous change in the resource dynamics, λ0, which we
assume as λ0 < 0 so as to start a process of subsequent adjustment. Until the detection of this
change, the firm operates in an environment where the resource behaves according to the process
8Assume for the sake of exposition t = τc, σ = 1 and a = 2b+ c, one obtains
q∗ =
c1(1− α1)eα1x + c2(1− α2)eα2x
c1eα1x + c2eα2x
.
If we have c1 = c2, α2 < 1 < α1, we obtain a shifted hyperbolic tangent function, directly related to the logistic
function. For general parameter values, therefore, the optimal extraction policy has a modulated sigmoid form.
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Figure 1: Sequential Detection
dXt = (µ− q∗0(t,Xt))dt+ σdWt, t ∈ [0, τ1], (26)
where τ1(λ0, ν) ≤ T is the optimal detection time. Its expectation, which is what the firm uses
as a reference for its decisions, is given by
E[τ1] =
2
λ20
(
e−ν + ν − 1) (27)
where the threshold ν solves 2
λ20
(eν − ν − 1) = T . Within this time interval, the optimal har-
vesting policy for the firm is given by (20):
q∗(t, x) = qm − σ2ψ
′(x)
ψ(x)
e−ρ(τ1−t)
Note that the “instantaneous” drift of the optimally controlled stock is given by
µ(x, t) = µ− qm + σ2ψ
′(x)
ψ(x)
e−ρ(τ1−t)
and as t→ τ1 the effective discount rate reduces and the drift increases. At the end of the time
period the resource stock will be given by
X∗τ1 = X0 + [µ− qm] τ1 + σ2
∫ τ1
0
ψ′(Xt)
ψ(Xt)
e−ρ(τ1−t)dt+ σ
∫ τ1
0
dWt. (28)
where the second integral is to be interpreted in the Itô sense. Similar to (20), the overall
dynamics of the optimally controlled resource stock also comprise of a fixed growth part, given
by the natural growth µ and market preferences, and a variable growth part.
Period [τ1, τ2] : Once the new regime is detected at t = τ1, the firm then immediately reassesses
its optimal policy to q∗1(t, x), as the dynamics of the resource stock are now
dXt = (µ− λ0 − q∗1(t,Xt))dt+ σdWt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2]
In the meantime, however, while the firm assumes a constant λ0, its past decisions start to catch
up. The growth of the “new” process will modify as a function of the past harvesting actions,
yielding a change in drift λ1(q∗0) given by
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λ1(q
∗
0) =
µ ∆X0 ∆X0 < 0
µ
√
∆X0 ∆X0 > 0
(29)
where ∆X0 =
X∗τ1 −X0
X0
(30)
Equations (29) and (30) indicate that the magnitude of change in drift λ depends on how much
the resource stock has deviated from its initial value. The observed sign will depend on whether
the firm’s harvesting actions have generated a net increase or decrease in the total stock of
the resource. Note that the effect net change in stock levels has on the resource’s capacity to
regenerate is not symmetric. This is to capture the fact that an ecosystem is more vulnerable
to negative shocks. When λ1(q∗0) is negative due to a net decrease it has a linear impact on the
growth rate. However when λ1(q∗0) is positive, the effect is concave. The sign and magnitude
of the change in stock is assumed known by the firm, but when the regime actually changes
is uncertain and is to be detected. At τ2(λ1(q∗0), ν) ≤ T the firm will (on average) detect this
change in regime of the resource dynamics. Its expectation, which is what the firm uses as a
reference for its decisions, is given by
E[τ2] =
2
λ1(q∗0)2
(
e−ν + ν − 1) (31)
where the threshold ν solves 2λ1(q∗0 )2 (e
ν − ν − 1) = T .
The optimal policy for this period is easily seen to have the same form as the one for the
previous period: normalizing time to t0 = τ1, one immediately recognizes that the two problems
are equivalent, with a change in drift from µ to µ− λ0. We therefore have
q∗1(t, x) = q
m − σ2 ψ˜
′(x)
ψ˜(x)
e−ρ(τ2−t), (32)
where the exponents ψ˜(x) are equivalent as before but substituting µ− λ0 in the coefficient A.
This optimal policy is maintained up to the second detection time τ2, where the firm assesses
the resource stock given by
X∗τ2 = X
∗
τ1 + [µ− λ0 − qm] τ2 + σ2
∫ τ1+τ2
τ1
ψ˜′(Xt)
ψ˜(Xt)
e−ρ(τ2−t)dt+ σ
∫ τ1+τ2
τ1
dWt.
Period [τ2, τ3] : Similar to previous periods, once the new regime is detected at t = τ2, the
firm will reassess its optimal policy to q∗2(t, x), as the dynamics of the resource stock are now
dXt = (µ− λ0 ± λ1(q∗0)− q∗2(t,Xt))dt+ σdWt, t ∈ [τ2, τ3]
In the meantime, the growth of the resource will modify as a function of the past harvesting
actions, yielding a change in drift λ2(q∗1) given by
λ2(q
∗
1) =
(µ− λ0) ∆X
∗
τ1 ∆X
∗
τ1 < 0
(µ− λ0)
√
∆X∗τ1 ∆X
∗
τ1 > 0
where ∆X∗τ1 =
X∗τ2 −X∗τ1
X∗τ1
For subsequent periods, the problem then continues sequentially.
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More generally, for the period [τi, τi+1] where i = 1, 2...n we can model the optimal extraction
policy as:
q∗i (t, x, λi−1) = q
m − σ2ψ
′(x, λi−1)
ψ(x, λi−1)
e−ρ(τi+1−t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
qv(t, x, λi−1)
(33)
the resource rent as:
Vx(t, x, λi−1) = σ2
ψ′(x, λi−1)
ψ(x, λi−1)
e−ρ(τi+1−t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
qv(t, x, λi−1)
(2b+ c) (34)
the change in the growth of the resource dependent on its past harvesting actions as9:
λi =

(
µ+
∑i−1
j=0 λj − λi−1)
X∗τi−X
∗
τi−1
X∗τi−1
∆X∗τi−1 < 0
(
µ+
∑i−1
j=0 λj − λi−1)
√
X∗τi−X∗τi−1
X∗τi−1
∆X∗τi−1 > 0
(35)
and the firm will (on average) detect the regime shift at:
E[τi+1] =
2
λi(q∗ex)2
(
e−ν + ν − 1) (36)
Observe that in each period the final level of resource is a random variable, and therefore so
is the impact on the new growth rate, however it is continuously dependent on the optimal
harvesting policy. The variation in X is conserved in the magnitude, the absolute value of the
percentage change in the resource stock translates directly to a change in drift. The larger is
the difference between initial level of stock, the larger will be the magnitude of the change in
resource growth rate λi. This implies, on average, an earlier expected time of detection. Once
this detection occurs, the parameter will either increase or decrease the probability of extinction
of the resource by entering the SDE drift with the same sign as the difference between initial
and final level of resource biomass. We discuss this in further detail in section 4.
3 Characteristics of the Solution
Due to the sequential nature of the detection process and the stochastic dynamics of the resource,
there is no steady state in our model. The system is non stationary and is randomly changing
and as a result optimal harvest must be specified for every state that can possibly occur. Addi-
tionally, in a multi-period setting, the detection of each regime shift alters the monopolist’s time
horizon. This is evident in Figure 2(a), which shows a possible time path of the stock biomass,
for the first four periods, being harvested under the profit maximizing policies of the firm. As
the monopolist detects each regime shift, represented by the red dashed lines, it’s horizon for
the period changes and it pursues the appropriate optimal policy. Panel (b) shows an example
of the firm extracting the resource to extinction, with a collapse occurring in the third period.
The varying time horizon of each period plays into the firm’s extraction decisions.
With (33) and (34), we can now examine how a change in regime and its detection affects the
firm decisions. To do this we choose a range of values for the model parameters, which are
meant to be largely illustrative. In section 4 we simulate our model with values taken from real
examples. Figure 3 shows the optimal extraction policy of the firm in the first period [0, τ1]
as shown in (20). The resource has a natural growth µ = 6000 tonnes/year and σ = 3250
9Note that in the first period [0, τ1] the change in drift, λ0 is assumed to be exogenous and not dependent on
past harvest efforts.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 2: Simulated Time Paths of the Optimally Controlled Stock Biomass. Red dashed lines
represent detection times. Panels (a) and (b): For a demand function of the form p(q) = 3−0.1q
, variable cost function c(q) = 0.5q2/2 and fixed cost F = 0.25. The natural growth of the
resource µ = 5, variance σ = 3 and T = 50. λ0 = −1.5 and X0 = 10. The values are in thousand
tonnes and years. Panel (b) results in resource extinction. Panel (c): simulation of 10 time
paths with equal parameters which result in different extraction-dependent detection times. All
simulations are done with a Shoji-Ozaki discretization method for the time-dependent drift.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 3: Panel (a): Optimal extraction policies for the monopolist. For a demand function of
the form p(q) = 5 − 0.75q , variable cost function c(q) = 1.25q2/2 and fixed cost F = 0.5. The
natural growth of the resource µ = 6, variance σ = 3.25. The values are in thousand tonnes and
years. Panel (b): Price set by the monopolist. Panel (c): Resource rent for the monopolist at
low (X = 1) and high (X = 10) stock level.
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tonnes/year. The firm incurs a variable cost with c = 1.25, a fixed cost of 500 $/tonne/year and
applies a discount rate of ρ = 0.02. We illustrate the case of a negative regime shift as it is of
more interest and relevance today. Suppose the ecological system undergoes a change, resulting
in a modified drift with λ = −2500 tonnes/year. In Figure 3 panel (a), we observe that at lower
stock levels the firm adopts a precautionary behaviour for all detection periods. This is due
to the negative regime shift reducing the growth rate of the resource and creating a physical
scarcity. This, consecutively, increases the resource rent and reduces the extraction levels by the
monopolist. Panel (c) depicts the resource rent for the monopolist at various detection periods
for two different stock levels. Note that for a low stock, a decline in resource growth i.e. a
negative regime shift always leads to an increase in the value of the marginal unit of in situ
stock.
On the contrary for higher stock levels the monopolist adopts an aggressive approach and in-
creases it’s extraction. To understand this behaviour, remember the rule of thumb for pricing
for a monopolist:
P =
MC
1 + 1Ed
(37)
The firm in our model is a pure monopolist thus its demand curve is the market demand curve
and Ed = 1 − abq∗(t,Xt) . For a given slope, unchanged consumer preferences and large resource
stocks, by extracting higher levels, compared to pre-regime shift , the monopolist can in fact
charge a higher price. This is shown in panel (b). Therefore at higher stock levels, the scarcity
effect is outweighed by the increase in the markup over the marginal cost which reduces the
resource rent and results in higher extraction by the monopolist. There is another factor driving
the increased extraction efforts by the monopolist - the decision horizon of the firm. In panel (a)
observe the increase in extraction is not uniform across all detection periods. Remember from
section 2.3, the model implies, larger is the regime shift, the quicker a firm is likely to detect and
shorter is the time horizon for that period. If the monopolist is faced with a short time horizon
and high levels of resource stock, it increases its extraction even more than it would for the same
stock levels and a longer detection period. This is because the monopolist believes that another
shift in regime could happen very soon and resource extinction or collapse may be impending.
This behaviour is also reflected in the price setting decision by the monopolist, as seen in panel
(b).
In panel (c) the behaviour of the resource rent for a higher stock level is more varied compared
to that of a lower stock. A decline in resource growth rate reduces the rent which increases
the firm’s extraction. This effect is amplified for shorter detection periods. However if the
regime shift is exceptionally large, the rent starts to increase and the firm may decide to lower
its extraction. For this reason, at high stock levels, the extraction decisions of the firm is a
combination of market dynamics and the altered time horizon from the detection of the regime.
The interplay between these two factors is evident in Figure 4. The resource undergoes a regime
shift similar to Figure 3 and additionally in panel (a) and (b) the market preferences change
as the slope of the monopolist’s demand curve becomes steeper indicating that the demand for
the resource is now less elastic. The extraction levels for longer detection periods and all stock
levels continue to be lower than the pre-regime shift levels. However, for short detection periods
and higher stock levels, the firm increases its extraction, and continues to charge a higher price.
This highlights the effect of urgency or impending doom that drives the monopolist’s decisions.
In panel (c) and (d) the regime shift is accompanied with a change in consumer preferences
as shown by a decline in the maximum price the consumers would be willing to pay for the
resource. The monopolist exhibits an aggressive extraction behaviour even for longer detection
periods and higher stock levels as it is able to charge a higher price.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 4: Panel (a): Optimal extraction policies for the monopolist facing a regime shift in
the resource dynamics and a change in the slope of the market demand. Panel (c): Optimal
extraction policies for the monopolist facing a regime shift in the resource dynamics and a change
in the maximum price the consumers would pay for the resource. Panel (b) and Panel (d): Price
set by the monopolist. Firm parameters are the same as Figure 3
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4 Risk of Catastrophe
We define the risk of catastrophe as the situation in which the instantaneous drift of the
resource stock Xt is negative in period i at any time t ∈ [τi, τi+1]:
µ+
i−1∑
j=0
λj − qm + σ2
∫ t
τi
ψ˜′(Xs)
ψ˜(Xs)
e−ρ(τi+1−s)ds < 0, (38)
which implies that P (limt→∞Xt = 0) = 1. To illustrate the emergence of catastrophe risk, let us
suppose the firm finds itself at t = τi, with an optimally controlled stock level X∗τi . Expliciting
again the dependence of the sign λi on the difference between initial and final levels of stock for
each period, for the subsequent period the resource stock will follow the controlled process given
by
dXt =
µ+ i−1∑
j=0
λj · sign(X∗j−1 −X∗j−2)− q∗i (X, t)
 dt+ σdWt
until the next detection time τi+1, and for all t ∈ [τi, τi+1] the profit-maximizing extraction
policy will be q∗i (x, t). Let us suppose that µ +
∑i−1
j=0 λj · sign(X∗j−1 − X∗j−2) > 0 so that the
firm does not find itself under risk. The firm at this point begins the detection process for the
next change of regime, which will be given by (35) and if λi < 0, the firm will realize the future
emergence of catastrophe risk if
µ+
i∑
j=0
λj < 0,
noting that the sum goes to period i, meaning that at the next detection time τi+1 the new
regime will be one in which the drift of the resource stock process will be negative, meaning that
the resource will have a net tendency to be driven towards an extinction state (X = 0).
First passage time to catastrophe: At this moment the firm may have to reassess its
extraction policies, due to the fact that the resource growth rate has been affected by its past
extraction decisions to a point where extinction is likely. In fact, the probability of the resource
being zero in infinite time is unity, which means that the resource eventually will be depleted.
The firm, however, can now exploit the non-stationary nature of the time intervals in which it
operates: a first immediate analysis should be what happens if it stops extracting. Normalizing
time to τi = 0, we define the probability of extinction as
φ(x) = Pr
[
inf
t∈R+
Xt ≤ 0
∣∣∣∣X0 = X∗τi , q∗(t,Xt) = 0] (39)
and the first time to catastrophe as
τc = inf[ t|Xt ≤ 0, X0 = X∗τi , q∗(t,Xt) = 0]. (40)
Then Xt follows simply a drifted Brownian motion and the problem is equivalent of finding where
a standard Brownian motion crosses the line x − µ −∑ij=0 λj (remember that µ +∑ij=0 λj is
negative). It’s a classic stochastic analysis problem, and it allows the firm to realize that if it
stops extracting the expected time to catastrophe is
Eτc =
X∗τi∣∣∣µ+∑ij=0 λj∣∣∣ . (41)
and the probability of extinction is
φ(x) = exp
−2
(
|µ+∑ij=0 λj |)
σ2
x
 . (42)
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If Eτc ≤ τi+1, on average the resource will be depleted within the detection period even if the
firm stops extracting altogether: we are therefore in a situation of irreversible catastrophe,
where even the most precautionary of extraction behavior cannot avoid on average the resource
from being depleted. In other words, since extraction always reduces the drift, (41) gives the
upper bound on all first times to catastrophe. Since deviation from the optimal policy is costly,
it is likely that the firm will continue its extraction policy until extinction. If the firm stops
extracting, then the first passage time to catastrophe τcat, for a resource stock starting at X∗τi ,
will be distributed according to the following density:
P{τcat ∈ dt} =
X∗τi√
2piσ2t3
exp
(
− (X
∗
τi − (µ+
∑i
j=0 λj)t)
2
2σ2t
)
dt,
= IG
(∣∣∣∣∣ X∗τiµ+∑ij=0
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
(
X∗τi
σ
)2)
, (43)
which follows an inverse Gaussian distribution. Because of the stochastic fluctuations, the firm
cannot know with certainty whether the first passage time will happen before the next regime
change, but it can have an average measurement of its probability. If Eτc ≥ τi+1, so if Xτi >
µτi+1, catastrophe is on average avoidable within the first detection period if the firm stops
extraction, therefore the firm can study whether its optimal extraction policy allows to avoid it
as well. In other words, the firm wants to check whether
Eτc ≤ τi+1,
τc = inf[ t|Xt ≤ 0, t ∈ [0, τi+1], X0 = X∗τi ].
Define ψ(t) = ψ(t;Xτi , 0) the density function of the first time to catastrophe: then we have
that
1− ψ(t) = 1− φ(0, t), (44)
where φ(x, t) is the probability that the optimally controlled resource stockX∗t hits the absorbing
barrier at 0, and can be written as
φ(x, t) = Pr
[
inf
s∈[t,τi+1]
X∗s ≤ 0
∣∣∣∣Xt = x] ,
for 0 ≤ t ≤ τi+1. The firm therefore has to solve the Kolmogorov forward equation given by
∂
∂t
φ(x, t) +
∂
∂x
φ(x, t)
µ+ i−1∑
j=1
λj − q∗(t, x)
+ σ2
2
∂2
∂x2
φ(x, t) = 0 (45)
with absorbing boundary conditions given by{
φ(x, τi+1) = 1 x ≤ 0
φ(x, τi+1) = 0 x > 0,
(46)
φ(0, t) = 1,
φ(t,∞) = 0.
The KFE for this problem has no closed form solution, given the dependence of the extraction
policy on both x and t, and needs to be solved numerically with standard methods. Once the
solution is obtained, the firm can recover the density of the first time to catastrophe τc from
(44) and compute its expectation: if Eτc ≥ τi+1 the firm continues its optimal extraction policy.
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5 Real-time detection and optimal extraction
The optimal extraction policy in each time interval [τi, τi+1] is obtained by assuming as time
horizon the expectation of the optimal stopping time E[τ(−λ, ν)]. This is therefore an ex ante
policy: the actual detection of when the regime shift happens is not included except for the
first moment of the procedure. The time θ at which the regime changes, however, is a random
variable: the firm therefore will use the expected detection time (31) to evaluate the boundary
conditions, but simultaneously observe continuously the optimally controlled level of stock Xt,
change to the measure Q and compute the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the two measures
(before and after the regime change) and check whether its value exceeds the threshold value ν.
If the threshold is reached before the expected detection time τi+1, then the firm simply switches
to the subsequent period with the modified drift, since the regime shift has been detected. If
the expected detection time τi+1 is reached and the threshold has not yet been reached (i.e. the
regime has not yet shifted), the firm continues the optimal extraction and does not switch to the
next period, but using an infinitesimal time interval as horizon. In other words, the infinitesimal
optimal extraction policy if the expected detection time is exceeded is given by
q∗i (t, x, λi−1)dt = q
mdt− σ2ψ
′(x, λi−1)
ψ(x, λi−1)
eρdt (47)
(note that eρdt ∼ 1, and for numerical simulations dt is the size of the time mesh), until either
the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the measures of the two regimes reaches the threshold ν, or
until the firm’s tolerance time limit T is reached. Assuming the real-time observations arrive at
a frequency ∆t, then the residual process on which the firm has to apply the detection procedure
is Xti −Xti−∆t − (µ+
∑i−1
j=1 λj − q∗(t,Xt−∆t))∆t.
6 Concluding Remarks
Much of the literature on natural resources assumes a fixed and exogenous price, we introduce
a model where a monopolist firm operates in a resource market where the prices are endoge-
nously determined. Ecological uncertainty is introduced in the form of regime shifts that several
ecosystems undergo, for example lakes may shift from a clear to a turbid state, affecting the fish
population and water quality. These shifts are made to be dependent on the the monopolist’s
extraction efforts. Unlike previous work, we explicitly model the firm’s detection process of the
regime change and incorporate it in it’s profit maximizing policies. Our closed form solutions
help us pin down the mechanisms driving the extraction behaviour of the firm. In the event of a
negative regime shift, for low stock levels, an increase in the the resource rent results in the firm
adopting a precautionary policy by extracting less. For higher stock levels, a regime shift leads
to an increase in extraction due to an altered and relatively shorter time horizon and demand
elasticity - which reduces the resource rent and results in the monopolist adopting an aggressive
behaviour.
In concluding, some caveats are clearly in order. Our model is intentionally simple and stylized.
An initial criticism maybe the assumption of a monopoly. Although a pure monopoly maybe
rare, and a game theoretic approach of several powerful players interacting, maybe more ap-
propriate to the renewable resource market - our primary aim with the model is to see how a
firm, whose prices are not exogenous, decides its extraction levels in the event of detecting a
regime shift. Starting with a monopoly is the first step and a novel benchmark before extend-
ing research in that direction. Lastly, we have made two simplifying assumptions in the form
a constant growth rate and cost function that is not directly dependent on stock. Both these
assumptions can be relaxed at the expense of greater mathematical and numerical demand.
19
References
Alvarez, L. H. and E. Koskela (2007). Optimal harvesting under resource stock and price uncer-
tainty. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 31 (7), 2461–2485.
Andersen, P. and J. G. Sutinen (1984). Stochastic bioeconomics: A review of basic methods and
results. Marine Resource Economics 1 (2), 117–136.
Arvaniti, M., A.-S. Crépin, and C. K. Krishnamurthy (2019). Time-consistent resource manage-
ment with regime shifts. Economics Working Paper Series 19.
Baggio, M. and P. L. Fackler (2016). Optimal management with reversible regime shifts. Journal
of Economic Behavior & Organization 132, 124–136.
Batt, R. D., S. R. Carpenter, J. J. Cole, M. L. Pace, and R. A. Johnson (2013). Changes in
ecosystem resilience detected in automated measures of ecosystem metabolism during a whole-
lake manipulation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110 (43), 17398–17403.
Carpenter, S. R., W. A. Brock, J. J. Cole, and M. L. Pace (2014). A new approach for rapid
detection of nearby thresholds in ecosystem time series. Oikos 123 (3), 290–297.
Chavez, F. P., J. Ryan, S. E. Lluch-Cota, and M. Ñiquen (2003). From anchovies to sardines
and back: multidecadal change in the pacific ocean. science 299 (5604), 217–221.
Crandall, M., H. Ishii, and P. Lions (1992). User’s guide to viscosity solutions of second order
partial differential equations. Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 27 (1), 1–67.
Crandall, M. G. and P.-L. Lions (1981). Condition d’unicité pour les solutions généralisées des
équations de Hamilton-Jacobi du premier ordre. C. R. Acad. Sci. Paris Sér. I Math. 292 (3),
183–186.
de Avila, A. L., G. Schwartz, A. R. Ruschel, J. do Carmo Lopes, J. N. M. Silva, J. O. P.
de Carvalho, C. F. Dormann, L. Mazzei, M. H. M. Soares, and J. Bauhus (2017). Recruitment,
growth and recovery of commercial tree species over 30 years following logging and thinning
in a tropical rain forest. Forest ecology and management 385, 225–235.
de Zeeuw, A. and X. He (2017). Managing a renewable resource facing the risk of a regime shift
in the ecological system. Resource and Energy Economics 48, 42–54.
Fleming, W. and H. Soner (2006). Controlled Markov Processes and Viscosity Solutions. Stochas-
tic Modelling and Applied Probability. Springer New York.
Hadjiliadis, O. and V. Moustakides (2006). Optimal and asymptotically optimal cusum rules
for change point detection in the brownian motion model with multiple alternatives. Theory
of Probability & Its Applications 50 (1), 75–85.
Klemas, V. (2013). Fisheries applications of remote sensing: an overview. Fisheries Research 148,
124–136.
Li, C.-Z., A.-S. Crépin, C. Folke, et al. (2018). The economics of resilience. International Review
of Environmental and Resource Economics 11 (4), 309–353.
Liu, J. (2014). Forest sustainability in c hina and implications for a telecoupled world. Asia &
the Pacific Policy Studies 1 (1), 230–250.
Nichols, J. D. and B. K. Williams (2006). Monitoring for conservation. Trends in ecology &
evolution 21 (12), 668–673.
Pauly, D. (1983). Some simple methods for the assessment of tropical fish stocks. Number 234.
Food & Agriculture Org.
20
Pindyck, R. S. (1984). Uncertainty in the theory of renewable resource markets. The Review of
Economic Studies 51 (2), 289–303.
Pindyck, R. S. (2002). Optimal timing problems in environmental economics. Journal of Eco-
nomic Dynamics and Control 26 (9-10), 1677–1697.
Pizarro, J. and E. S. Schwartz (2018). The valuation of fisheries rights: A real options approach.
Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Polasky, S., A. De Zeeuw, and F. Wagener (2011). Optimal management with potential regime
shifts. Journal of Environmental Economics and management 62 (2), 229–240.
Polunchenko, A. S., G. Sokolov, and W. Du (2013). Quickest change-point detection: A bird’s
eye view. arXiv preprint arXiv:1310.3285 .
Poor, H. V. and O. Hadjiliadis (2008). Quickest detection. Cambridge University Press.
Reed, W. J. (1988). Optimal harvesting of a fishery subject to random catastrophic collapse.
Mathematical Medicine and Biology: A Journal of the IMA 5 (3), 215–235.
Reed, W. J. and H. R. Clarke (1990). Harvest decisions and asset valuation for biological
resources exhibiting size-dependent stochastic growth. International Economic Review , 147–
169.
Ren, B. and S. Polasky (2014). The optimal management of renewable resources under the risk
of potential regime shift. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 40, 195–212.
Sakamoto, H. (2014). Dynamic resource management under the risk of regime shifts. Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 68 (1), 1–19.
Saphores, J.-D. (2003). Harvesting a renewable resource under uncertainty. Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control 28 (3), 509–529.
Scheffer, M., S. R. Carpenter, V. Dakos, and E. H. van Nes (2015). Generic indicators of
ecological resilience: inferring the chance of a critical transition. Annual Review of Ecology,
Evolution, and Systematics 46, 145–167.
Shimabukuro, Y. E., E. Arai, V. Duarte, A. Jorge, E. G. d. Santos, K. A. C. Gasparini, and A. C.
Dutra (2019). Monitoring deforestation and forest degradation using multi-temporal fraction
images derived from landsat sensor data in the brazilian amazon. International journal of
remote sensing 40 (14), 5475–5496.
Shiryaev, A. (1963). On optimum methods in quickest detection problems. Theory of Probability
& Its Applications 8 (1), 22–46.
Shiryaev, A. (1996). Minimax optimality of the method of cumulative sums (cusum) in the case
of continuous time. Russian Math. Surveys 51 (4), 750–751.
Szuwalski, C. S. and A. B. Hollowed (2016). Climate change and non-stationary population
processes in fisheries management. ICES Journal of Marine Science 73 (5), 1297–1305.
Viña, A., W. J. McConnell, H. Yang, Z. Xu, and J. Liu (2016). Effects of conservation policy
on china’s forest recovery. Science advances 2 (3), e1500965.
Walters, C. and J.-J. Maguire (1996). Lessons for stock assessment from the northern cod
collapse. Reviews in fish biology and fisheries 6 (2), 125–137.
21
A Viscosity solutions
In all that follows we will use as a reference Fleming and Soner (2006) as well as follow its
notations. What we want to achieve is to show that the value function V is a weak solution of
the optimization problem (15), and if we obtain a form of V we can conclude it solves the firm’s
problem (in a weak sense).
We write the HJB equation in form of its infinitesimal generator. Define the setD ∈ C([0, τc]×
R). Then V (t, x) ∈ D is a classical solution of the optimization problem (15) if it satisfies the
equation
− ∂
∂t
V +At[V (t, .)](x) = 0, (48)
where A is the generator of the HJB equation. If Xt were modeled as a geometric Brownian
motion, the state constraint would not need to apply, since the multiplicative nature of the noise
would naturally allow the resource stock to be positive, and because of the well-behaving nature
of the functional forms of the problem we expect a smooth solution for all Xt > 0. But imposing
Xt ≥ 0 does not imply that that the value function has to be differentiable at X = 0. Now,
define a continuous function H (the Hamiltonian) such that
At[φ](x) = H(t, x,Dφ(x), D2φ(x))
and consider the equation
− ∂
∂t
W (t, x) +H(t, x,DW (t, x), D2W (t, x)) = 0. (49)
A function V (t, x) ∈ C([0, τc]× R) is a viscosity subsolution of (49) if for all v ∈ C∞(D)
− ∂
∂t
v(t¯, x¯) +H(t¯, x¯, Dv(t¯, x¯), D2v(t¯, x¯)) ≤ 0
for every point (t¯, x¯) which is a local maximum of V − v. Similarly, V (t, x) is a viscosity
supersolution of (49) if if for all v ∈ C∞(D)
− ∂
∂t
v(t¯, x¯) +H(t¯, x¯, Dv(t¯, x¯), D2v(t¯, x¯)) ≥ 0.
for every point (t¯, x¯) ∈ D which is a local minimum of V −v. The function V (t, x) is a viscosity
solution of the equation (49) if it is both a viscosity subsolution and a viscosity supersolution.
This implies that the function V (t, x) is a weak solution of the optimization problem (15). Let
us now show that V is a viscosity solution of our problem (15).
Let v ∈ C2([0, τc] × R), let V − v be maximized at the point (t¯, x¯) ∈ ([0, τc] × R) and let us fix
an optimal control (extraction rate) q ∈ Q. Let X(.) = X(.; t, q) be the controlled stochastic
process that drives the resource stock. For every time τ > t¯ for which Xτ > 0, we have, using
Ito’s lemma and Bellman’s principle of optimality,
0 ≤ Et¯
[
V (t¯, x¯)− v(t¯, x¯)− V (τ, x(τ)) + v(τ, x(τ))]
τ − t¯
0 ≤ 1
τ − t¯Et¯
[∫ τ
t¯
Π(t, x, q)dt− v(t¯, x¯) + v(τ, x(τ))
]
.
This implies
0 ≤ vt(t¯, x¯) + Π(t¯, x, q) + vx(µ+ q) + σ
2
2
vxx
for all q ∈ Q: we can then write
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0 ≤ vt(t¯, x¯) + sup
q∈Q
[
Π(t¯, x, q) + vx(µ− q) + σ
2
2
vxx
]
0 ≤ vt −H(t¯, x¯, Dv(t¯, x¯), D2v(t¯, x¯)).
This proves that V is a viscosity subsolution of the problem (15). Proceeding similarly proves
that V is a viscosity supersolution of the problem: if V − v attains a minimum at (t¯, x¯) then for
any  > 0 and τ > t¯ we can find a control q ∈ Q such that
0 ≥ −(τ − t¯) + E
[∫ τ
t¯
Π(t, x, q)dt− v(t¯, x¯) + v(τ, x(τ))
]
which implies
 ≥ 1
τ − t¯Et¯
[∫ τ
t¯
Π(t, x, q)dt− v(t¯, x¯) + v(τ, x(τ))
]
.
Proceeding equivalently as before, one shows that V is a viscosity supersolution of (15). We
can conclude that V is a viscosity solution of (15). Note that for every time τe ∈ [0, τc] for
which Xτ > 0, since for optimality we have Πq(., q∗) − Vx = 0 and Π is continuous and twice
differentiable in q, it can be easily shown that the inequalities of the definition of sub- and
supersolution are satisfied with equality, which means that V (t, x) is also a classical solution of
(15) for each t = τe. We now need to deal with the positivity constraint. Given the “feasible”
set D′ = ([0, τc] × O ⊂ R+), we cannot impose that the value function V (t, x) is differentiable
(or continuous, for that matter) at 0 at the left boundary of ∂D′. Following Fleming and Soner
(2006), we need to impose a boundary inequality, which does not require neither V nor the
boundary ∂D′ to be differentiable at 0. This implies that the value function V (t, 0) must be a
viscosity subsolution of (15). Following the previous definitions, we must have
vt(t, 0) ≤ −H(t, 0, Dv,D2v) (50)
≤ sup
q∈Q
{
Π(t, x, q) + vx(0)(µ− q) + vxx(0)σ
2
2
}
(51)
for all continuous functions for which V − v is locally maximized around x = 0. Given a natural
boundary condition given by the fact that when the resource is zero, the extraction must be zero
and consequently the objective Π must be zero. Since V − v has to be maximized around 0, we
have
H(t, 0, a, ax) ≥ H(t, 0, vx(t, 0), vxx(t, 0)) ∀a ≥ vx(t, 0).
The proof is simple, one just needs to write H(t, 0, α, αx)) = supq∈Q Π(t, q) + α(µ + q) + αx σ
2
2
and use α ≥ vx(t, 0) to show the inequality holds. Given this result, condition (51) is easily
seen to be satisfied by V (t, 0) = 0, which we choose because of its immediate intuitive economic
interpretation. We therefore can say that the constrained viscosity solution given by
Vx(t, 0) ≥ Π(t, 0, q) (52)
V (t, 0) = 0 (53)
V (t, x) solves Vt −H(t, x,DV (t, x), D2V (t, x)) = 0 x ∈ [(0, τc]× R]
is a solution to the problem (15). Uniqueness of the solution is proven by means of the comparison
principle, and since the proof follows closely the one provided by Crandall et al. (1992), is omitted.
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